History of Iraq (1968–2003)

Republic of Iraq
جمهورية العراق
Jumhūriyat Al-Irāq (Arabic)

 

1968–2003
 

Flag Coat of arms
Motto
Wahda, Hurriyah, Ishtirakiyah
("Unity, Freedom, Socialism", 1968–1991)
Allāhu Akbar
("God is the Greatest", 1991–2003)
Anthem
Ardulfurataini Watan
("The Land of The Two Rivers", 1981–2003)
Location of Iraq.
Capital Baghdad
Language(s) Arabic
Government Ba'athist single-party state
President
 - 1968–1979 Hassan al-Bakr (first)
 - 1979–2003 Saddam Hussein (last)
Prime Minister
 - 1968 Abd an-Naif (first)
 - 1994–2003 Saddam Hussein (last)
Legislature National Assembly
Historical era Cold War
 - Ba'athist coup 1968
 - U.S.-led invasion 2003
Population
 - 2003 est. 25,175,000 
Currency Iraqi dinar (IQD)
Internet TLD .iq
Calling code +964

The History of the Republic of Iraq from 1968 to 2003, also known as Ba'athist Iraq, covers the period of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party's rule. This period began with high economic growth and soaring prosperity, but ended with a Iraq facing social, political, and economic stagnation. The average annual income decreased, because several external factors, and several internal policies of the regime.

Abdul Rahman Arif, the President, and Tahir Yahya, the Prime Minister, were ousted during a coup d'état led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of the Ba'ath Party. The Ba'ath Party which had previously held power in 1963, was led primarily by al-Bakr, its leader, and Saddam Hussein. Hussein through his post as de facto chief of the party's intelligence services, became the country's de facto leader by the mid-1970s, and became de jure leader in 1979 when he succeeded al-Bakr in office as President. During al-Bakr's de jure rule, Iraq's economy blossomed, and Iraq's standing within the Arab world increased. However, several internal factors were threatening the country's stability, among them the country's conflict with Iraq and the shia Muslim community. An external problem was the border conflict with Iran, which would contribute to the Iran–Iraq War.

Hussein became President, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Prime Minister and General Secretary of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party in 1979, during a wave of anti-regime protests in Iraq led by the Shia community. The Ba'ath Party, which was secular in nature, harshly repressed the protests. Another policy change was the Iraqi foreign policy towards Iran, a Shia Muslim country. Deteriorating relations eventually led to the Iran–Iraq War, which began when Iraq initiated a full-scale invasion of Iran in 1980. Iran, which had just been through a revolution, was believed to be weak, and a easy pick for the Iraqi military machine. This proved to be wrong, and the war lasted for eight years. The economy deteriorated during the war, and Iraq became depended on foreign donations to continue the war effort. A ceasefire was reached in 1988, which resulted in a status quo ante bellum.

With the war ending, Iraq found itself in the midst of an economic depression. The country owed millions of dollars to foreign countries, and was unable to pay its creditors back. Kuwait, which had deliberately increased oil output following the war, reduced international oil prices and further weakened the Iraqi economy. In reaction to this Hussein threatened to invade Kuwait if the country did not lower its oil output. Negotiations broke down, and on 2 August Iraq initiated the invasion of Kuwait. The international outcry led to the Gulf War, which Iraq lost. The United Nations (UN) initiated economic sanctions in the war's aftermath to weaken Hussein's regime. The country's economic conditions worsened during the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, and the beginning of the 2000s, Iraq's economy started to grow again because several states ignored the UN sanctions. In the wake of the September 11 attacks in 2001, the United States under President George W. Bush initiated a War on Terrorism, and labelled Iraq as a part of the so-called Axis of Evil. The United States and several other allied countries invaded Iraq in March of 2003, and the long-lasting Ba'athist Iraqi regime was finally toppled.

Contents

History

The coup of 1968

In contrast to previous coup d'etats in Iraq's history, the 1968 coup, referred to as the 17 July Revolution, was, according to Con Coughlin, "a relatively civil affair". The coup started in the early hours of 17 July, when a number of military units and civilian Ba'athists seized several key government and military buildings; these included amongst others the Ministry of Defence, the electricity station, radio stations, all the city's bridges and "a number of military bases". All telephone lines were cut at 3 A.M., and by this time several tanks had been given the command to halt in front of the Presidential Palace. Abdul Rahman Arif, the then-President of Iraq, first knew of the coup when jubilant members of the Republican Guard started shooting up in the air in "a premature triumph". Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the leader of the operation, told Arif about his situation through military communication hardware at the base of operations. Arif asked for more time; he used this time to contact other military units to seek support. As he soon found out, the odds were against him, and surrendered. Arif telephoned al-Bakr and told him that he was willing to resign, to show his gratitude, al-Bakr guaranteed his safety. al-Bakr's deputies, Hardan al-Tikriti and Saleh Omar al-Ali, were ordered to give Arif this message in person.[1] Arif was quickly sent on the first plane to London, UK along with wife and son. Later that morning, a ba'athist broadcast announced that a new government had been established. The coup was carried out with such ease that not even one single life was lost during the coup.[2]

The coup succeeded because of contributions made by the military; the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party was not strong enough to take power by itself. The Ba'ath Party managed to make a deal with Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif, the deputy head of military intelligence, and Ibrahim Daud, the head of the Republican Guard. Both Naif and Daud knew the Arif's and Tahir Yahya's government chance of long-term survival looked bleak, but also knew that the ba'athist needed them if the coup was to be successful. Naif demanded to be given the post of Prime Minister after the coup as a reward, and a symbol for his strength, for his participation in the coup. Daud was also "rewarded" with a post; he became Minister of Defence. However, not everything was going according to Naif's and Daud's plan, al-Bakr had told the Ba'ath leadership in a secret meeting that the two would be either liquidated "during, or after, the revolution".[3]

al-Bakr, as the leader of the coup's military operation, retained his position as Regional Secretary of the Ba'ath Party, and was elected to the posts of Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, President and Prime Minister. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a power struggle developed between al-Bakr and Naif. In all practicality, Naif should have had the upper hand; he was a respected officer and was supported by the common soldier. al-Bakr would, however, prove to be a more cunning, persuading and more organised then Naif, Daud and their supporters.[4] One of al-Bakr's first decisions in office was to appoint over 100 new officers to the Republican Guard. Saddam Hussein worked, in the meantime, to establish the party's security and intelligence organisation to combat the enemies. On 29 July, Daud left for a tour to Jordan to inspect the Iraqi troops located their following the Six Day War with Israel. The following day, on 30 July, Naif was invited to eat lunch at the Presidential Palace with al-Bakr. During their lunch, Hussein bursted into the room with three accomplishes and threatened Naif with death. Naif responded by crying out; "I have four children". Hussein ordered Naif to leave Iraq immediately if he wanted to live, a order in which Naif complied.[5] Naif was exiled to Morocco, and later assassinated on the orders of Hussein in 1978 in London, after an earlier failed assassination attempt in 1973. Daud shared a similar fate, and was exiled to Saudi Arabia. The ba'athist were by no means ensured of victory, if any of Naif's supporters had known of the operation against him, Baghdad could have become the centre, in the words of historian Con Coughlin, "of an ugly bloodbath".[6]

Early years and Hussein's rise to power (1968–1979)

al-Bakr managed to strengthen his position within the party with the help of Hussein's newly-established party security apparatus and the intelligence services. Most of 1968 was used to repress none-ba'athist thoughts and groups, for instance, a campaign against nasserist and communist was initiated under the command of Hussein.[7] Several spy plots were created by the government, spies that were "caught" were accused of being a part of a zionist plot agains the state.[8] The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was skeptical of the new ba'athist government, as many of its members remembered the anti-communist campaign launched against them by the ba'athist government of 1963. After taking power, al-Bakr offered the ICP cabinet positions in the new government, the ICP rejected this offer. al-Bakr responded by initiated a systematic campaign against the ICP and communist sympathisers. However, as historian Charles Tripp notes in his A History of Iraq, the campaign started "a curious game whereby the government alternately persecuted and courted the party until 1972–1973, when the ICP was offered, and accepted, membership in the National Progressive Front. (NPF). The reason for this "curious game" was the Ba'ath Party's belief that the ICP was more dangerous then it really was. When Aziz al-Haji broke away from the ICP, and established the Iraqi Communist Party (Central Command) and initated a "popular revolutionary war" against the regime, it was dully crushed. By April 1969 the "popular revolutionary" uprising had been crushed, and al-Haji recanted his believes publicly.[9] Another reason for this anti-communist policy was that many Ba'ath Party openly sympathised with communists or other socialist forces. However, at this stage, neither al-Bakr nor Hussein had enough support within the party to initiate a policy unpopular within it; at the Seventh Regional Congress of the Ba'ath Party both al-Bakr and other leading ba'athist expressed their support for "radical socialism".[10]

By the mid-to-late 1970s Hussein's power within the Ba'ath Party and the government, and became the de facto leader of the country, even if al-Bakr still was both President, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman. In 1977, following a wave of shiites protest against the government, al-Bakr relinquished his control over the Ministry of Defence; Adnan Khairallah Tulfah, Hussein's brother-in-law, was appointed defence minister. The appointment underlined the clannish character of the Ba'ath Party and government. In contrast to Hussein's fortunes, those of al-Bakr's were on the wane. Rumours of al-Bakr bad health started to circulate the country. By the end of 1977, al-Bakr had little de facto control over the country through his office as president. The reason why Hussein became president in 1977, but 1979, can be explained by Hussein's own insecurity.[11] Before making himself de jure head of state, Hussein initiated an anti-communist campaign; the ICP at this had no real power, most of its leading officials had left the country, or been imprisoned or killed by the regime. However, the campaign was not centered on the ICP, but fellow ba'athists who did not support Hussein. Hussein had initiated a similar campaign in 1978, that time to check were the loyalties of certain left-wingers were; ba'athism or socialism. Following the campaign, entered the Arab world stage for the first time under the banner of nasserism and Gamal Abdel Nasser by criticising the Camp David agreement between Anwar Sadat of Egypt and the state of Israel.[12]

In response to the Islamic Revolution in Iran several Iraqi shi'ites revolted against what they saw as a sunni-led government. This revolt led to the collapse of the Ba'ath Party in certain areas of the country. It was in this situation that Hussein took over the office of President, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman.[13] Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri was promoted to the office of vice-chairman, synonymous with the post of vice-president in the west. However, the shia revolt was not the only reason to take over as formal leader, there were rumours within top echelons of power that al-Bakr, with the assistance of those Iraqi ba'athists who opposed Hussein, was planning to designate Hafez al-Assad as his successor. Immediately after seizing power, over 60 members of the Ba'ath Party and government leadership had been charged with fomenting an anti-Iraqi ba'athist plot in collaboration with al-Assad and the Damascus-based Ba'ath Party.[14]

Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

Once he assumed the presidency, a cult of personality was created and centered around Hussein. He was represented as the father of the nation and of the Iraqi people. National institutions, such as the National Assembly, were established to strengthen the image of him fostered by the Iraqi propaganda machine.[15] The Ba'ath Party also contributed to the cult of personality; the Ba'ath Party was by 1979 a nationwide organisation, and became a propaganda center for pro-Hussein literature.[16] This propaganda campaign did, at least in the beginning, create a common sense of nationhood for many Iraqis.[17] The shi'ites protests were not quelled by these propaganda campaigns, and the establishment of a Islamic Republic in Iran, influenced many shi'ites to stand up against the sunni dominated government. At first, relations between Iran and Iraq were fairly good, but ideological difference could not remain concealed forever. The new Iranian leadership were Muslim fundamentalists, while the Iraqi ba'athists were secular by nature. Another major obstacle for relations was the Iraqi governments continued repression and discrimination of shi'ites.[18] At the beginning of 1980 several border clashes took place between the two countries. The Iraqi regime considered the newly-established Iran to be "weak"; the country was in a state of continued civil unrest, and the Iranian leaders had purged thousands of officers and soldiers because of their political views.[19]

The Iran–Iraq War was in theory, going to be a quick Iraqi victory. Hussein's plans was to strengthen Iraq's position in both the Persian Gulf and at the Arab world stage. A quick victory would restore Iraq's control over the whole of the Shatt al-Arab, an area which Iraq had lost to Iran in 1975.[20] Hussein abrogated the treaty of 1975 in a meeting of the National Assembly on 17 September 1980. This abrogation was followed shortly after by several pre-emptive strikes on Iran and by the invasion of Iran. Hussein believed that the Iranian regime would have "to disengage in order to survive". Not only was this view faulty, but it overestimated the strength of the Iraqi military and the Iranian regime saw the invasion as a test of the revolution itself and all its achievements.[21] The short way which Hussein planned for some time, proved just after a couple of weeks, proved to be something very different in reality. Hussein, "in a rare moment of frankness, [...] admitted as much".[22] While the war not going as planned, the regime reasserted its view on the situation, and claimed that winning the war was a matter of "national honour". The majority of the ba'athist leadership, and Hussein himself, still believed that Iran would collapse under the weight of pure Iraqi force.[23]

In 1982 Iran counter-attacked and was successful in driving the Iraqis back into Iraq. That year alone, an estimated 40,000 Iraqis had been taken prisoners. The defeats of 1982 were a blow to both Hussein and the ba'ath regime. With the economic situation worsening because of falling oil prices, and the rising military budget, the Iraqi standard of living worsened. The Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba'ath Military Command, Regional Command and National Command meet in one extraordinary session in 1982, with Hussein absent, to discuss the possibilities of a ceasefire proposal to the Iranian government. The ceasefire proposal made at the meeting was rejected by the Iranian regime. If the proposal had been accepted, Hussein would have not have survived politically, the proposal was supported by all the members of the Regional Command, National Command and the Revolutionary Command Council. It was at this time that rumours started circulating that Hussein would step down as president to make place for al-Bakr, the former president. As events showed, this did not happen, and al-Bakr died in 1982 under mysterious circumstances.[24] Major losses of life in the conflict,[25] nearly led to a military mutinity led by Maher Abdul Rashid, the father-in-law of Hussein's second son.[26] Rashid started to criticise publicy, and claimed that loss of life could have been averted if it wasn't for Hussein's meddling into military affairs.[27] This confrontation with the military led to greater independence of military planning from ba'athist leadership interference. Shortly after the Iraqi Air Force once again established air superiority.[28] These changes in organisation led to Hussein focusing most of his energy on Iraqi Kurdistan, which had revolted. Hussein appointed his cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid as military chief in Kurdistan. al-Majid initiated the al-Anfal campaign; chemical weapons were used against civilians.[29] In April 1988, after a series of Iraqi military victories, a ceasefire was agreed upon between Iraq and Iran; the war is commonly considered a status quo ante bellum.[30]

The Gulf War, the 1990s and the US invasion (1988–2003)

In the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq War Kuwait intentionally increased the country's oil output, this led to a international price decrease on oil. Hussein reacted by threatening to invade Kuwait if they continued to increase their oil output; oil output continued to increase. Saudi Arabia, frighthened by Hussein's military strength, persuaded Kuwait to lower its oil output. Unfortunately for Saudi Arabia, when Kuwait lowered its oil output Venezuela increased its. Hussein then ordered the invasion of Kuwait in order to solve the country's economic problems, and the professed goal to unite Iraq; Kuwait was considered by many Iraqis as part of Iraq.[31] On 18 July 1990 Hussein demanded Kuwait to repay Iraq for the oil they had, according to Hussein, stolen and to nullified Iraq's debt to Kuwait. The Kuwaiti leadership failed to respond, and on 2 August 1990 the Iraqi military began the invasion of Kuwait. The invasion led to an international outcry, the United Nations, United States and the United Kingdom condemned the invasion actions and introduced sanctions against Iraq, while the Soviet Union and several Arab states condemned the invasion. George H. W. Bush, the President of the United States, demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the restoration of the Kuwaiti government. Hussein responded by making Kuwait an Iraqi province.[32] The Gulf War was initiated by a United States-led coalition, which succeeded in winning the war in less than a year.[33]

On the evening of 24 February, several days before the Gulf War ceasefire was signed in Safwan, the Saudi Arabia-based Voice of Free Iraq radio station, funded and operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, broadcasted a message to the Iraqis telling them to rise up and overthrow Hussein. The speaker on the radio was Salah Omar al-Ali, a former member of the Ba'ath Party and the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. Al-Ali's message urged the Iraqis to overthrow the "criminal tyrant of Iraq". Al-Ali's radio broadcast encouraged Iraqis to "stage a revolution" and claimed that "[Hussein] will flee the battlefield when he becomes certain that the catastrophe has engulfed every street, every house and every family in Iraq."[34] Believing that the United States were on their side, a nationwide uprising against Hussein's rule began in March 1991.[35] The uprising was repressed by Hussein loyalist forces. The United Nations established a no-fly zone to halt the advance of Hussein's forces; it worked. Instead of occupying Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish Autonomous Republic established, with thousand of Iraqi troops stationed at the Iraqi-Iraqi Kurdish border.[36] The oppression of the rebellion led thousands of people to flee their homes to, mostly, Turkey or Iran. On 2 April and 3 April 1991 Turkey and Iran respectively brought the issue up at the UN Security Council. The Security Council adopted Resolution 688 which stated that Iraq had to allow access for international humanitarian organisations, and report openly about government repression.[37]

In 2002 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, which stated that Iraq had failed to fulfill its obligations demanded by the UN. The United States and the United Kingdom would use Resolution 1441 as a pretext for war. The 2003 US-led invasion of the country forced the Ba'ath Party and Hussein to go underground.[38] Hussein was captured later that year, and was executed in 2006.[39]

Politics

Political system

The 1970 Iraqi Constitution stated that Iraq was in a transitional phase of developing; in ba'athist ideology the transitional stage is the time when the Arab people unite to establish one Arab nation. The end of the transitional era would be marked by the enactment of a permanent constitution, the 1970 constitution was only temporary. The Ba'ath Party dominated all government institutions. The top decision-making body in the country was the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC was controlled by the Ba'ath Party; RCC members had to be members of the Ba'ath Party's Regional Command. Saddam Hussein, as President of Iraq, was also RCC chairman and General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party's Regional- and National Command.[40] All decisions within the RCC had to be decided through votes, a proposition could only be enacted if two thirds of RCC members voted in favour of it. A Council of Ministers, the cabinet, was established on the orders of the RCC to execute RCC orders submitted to it. A National Assembly existed which was in theory democratically elected by the Iraqi people; the problem was that the RCC had the authority to decide how much or little powers the National Assembly should ensue or have.[41]

The constitution of 1970 proclaimed ba'athist Iraq as "a sovereign people's democratic republic" dedicated to the establishment of a ba'athist socialist society. Although the state was officially secular Islam was proclaimed the country's state religion, freedom of religion was tolerated although. Natural resources and principal means of productions were defined as belonging to the Iraqi people. The Iraqi government was responsible for directing and planning the national economy.[42] If the RCC chairman was incapacitated or dead the first in the line of succession was the RCC deputy chairman; there were only two RCC deputy chairmen under ba'athist rule, Hussein (1968–1979) and Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri (1979–2003).[43]

Ba'ath Party

National leaders Regional leaders
Name Term Name Term
Michel Aflaq 1968–1989 Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr 1966–1979
Saddam Hussein 1989–2003 Saddam Hussein 1979–2003

Iraq, under the rule of the Iraqi-led Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, was a single-party state.[44] The Regional Command (RC, the Iraqi-cell of the Ba'ath Party) was the party's top decision-making body; Regional Command members were elected for five-year terms at the party's regional congress. The Regional Secretary, commonly referred to as General Secretary, was the head of the Regional Command, chaired its sessions and was the party leader over the Ba'ath Party cell in Iraq. In theory members of the Regional Command were responsible to the party congress, but in practice they controlled the congress, and the leadership often decided the result beforehand. The party's National Command was, in theory, the highest decision-making body. It was responsible for coordinating the pan-Arab ba'ath movement. All National Command members came from their distinct regional (literally meaning country in ba'athist etymology) cell, for instance, there was always a member who represented the Ba'ath Party's cell in Jordan.[45] Because of the 1966 Ba'ath Party schism which split the ba'ath movement in two halfs, one Iraqi-branch and one Syrian-branch, the National Command never controlled the whole ba'ath movement since there was another National Command, headquartered in Syria, which also commanded the ba'ath movement. Another problem was the fact that the National Command, in both Iraq and Syria, were under the control of the country's respective regional commands.[46]

National Progressive Front

The National Progressive Front (NPF) was a popular front, led by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, established on 17 July 1973, the fifth anniversary of the 17 July Revolution. The NPF charter was signed by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, representing the Ba'ath Party, and Aziz Muhammad, the First Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). In Al-Thawrah, a ba'athist newspaper, the charter was hailed as a success for the revolution.[47] The ICP was not the only party to join, but the most prominent; the ICP left the NPF in March 1979. While officially an independent organisations, and the only non-ba'athist political arena, the NPF's leadership consisted entirely of ba'athist members or ba'athist loyalists. The whole point with the organisation was to give the ba'athist regime as semblance of popular support.[48] Throughout the NPF's existence Naim Haddad was the NPF's General Secretary.[49]

Opposition

The Iraqi opposition manifested itself in three forms; guerilla warfare against the regime, acts of sabotage and terrorism and desertion from the Iraqi Army or the country's paramilitary forces; the Popular Army and Fedayeen Saddam. The largest opposition forces were headquartered in Iraqi Kurdistan, represented by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Other organisation who opposed the regime was the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the al-Da'wa party headquartered in Teheran, Iran and the Umma Party based in London, UK. A major problem with the Iraqi opposition was the lack of alliances between opposition groups. Although some alliances did exist, for instance, the alliance between the ICP and the KDP. The alliance led to the ICP to move it headquarters to Iraqi Kurdistan, their activities in other areas of Iraq were routinely repressed. The ba'athist regime was never able to take full control of the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the exception of an interregnum between the end of the Iran–Iraq War and the 1991 uprising.[50] Another problem was that the Iraqi opposition constantly had problems with internal infighting, for instance, the ICP were forced to hold a party congress in 1985 to stabilise the party. A more immediate problem was the strength of Iraq's secret services, renowned in the Arab world as the most efficient.[51]

In contrast to the secular opposition, the religious opposition, mostly represented by the shias, was better organised and stronger. Several religious opposition groups could appeal to Iraqis because of the secular nature of the ba'athist government. During the Iran–Iraq War the government allowed some degree of religious freedom, but only to win support from the shia populace.[52]

State ideology

Political divisions

During the Ba'athist era, Iraq officially maintained most of the territory currently part of Iraq. A border dispute existed with Saudi Arabia until 1981. From 1980 to 1988, during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq occupied and annexed portions of Iran. From 1990 to 1991, Iraq occupied and annexed Kuwait. The annexation of Kuwait was not recognized and was declared a violation of Kuwait's sovereignty by the United Nations. A UN-authorized international military coalition forced Iraqi military forces to retreat from Kuwait during the Gulf War and subsequently Kuwait's sovereignty was restored.

Economy

Planning system

When the Ba'ath Party took power in 1968, the Five-Year Plan, set up by the previous regime in 1965, was allowed to continue to its end date in 1969 since the Ba'ath Party did not have a economic policy of their own.[53] The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decided, by the mid-1970s to alter the planning system, instead of creating stable Five-Year Plans as had been done earlier, an annual investment plan was to be created. Every year, the RCC convened to create an investment for the year to come; for example, there were separate investments plans for the year 1976 and 1977. Another change is that the plan's final draft was not accepted by the highest economic elite, rather, it was accepted by the RCC, the political elite.[54] In 1976, in a break with the new trend, the RCC introduced the National Development Plan, which was set to last from 1976 to 1980. Unlike the previous plans, the sectoral investment allocation figures were not made public.[55]

Economic growth

The Iraq Petroleum Company (ICP), the largest oil company in Iraq, was a private company. In March 1970 the ICP was forced to concede 20 percent of the company's share to the government.[56] The full nationalisation of the ICP happened when the company, in March 1971, cut its oil production by half. Such a decision would hamper Iraqi economic growth. The company was nationalised in June 1971. The nationalisation removed the last remaining element of foreign control over Iraq, and was therefore very popular with the Iraqi people. The government anticipated a loss of revenue, and therefore sent Saddam Hussein to the Soviet Union to negotiate a treaty. The visit was a success, and ended with the signing of the Iraqi–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and the establishment of a trade agreement. The trade agreement stated that the Soviet Union would buy some of Iraq's oil to soften the anticipated blow it would have on Iraq's oil exporting. The signing of a treaty with the Soviet Union led to a visit by Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and that the Iraqi Communist Party was given two cabinet posts.[57]

After the nationalisation of the IPC, Iraq's oil revenue increased from, in 219 million ID in 1972 1.7 billion ID in 1974, to 3.7 billion ID in 1978 to 8.9 billion ID in 1980. In short, Iraq increased its oil revenue by over 40 times in less than a decade. With the success of the Iranian revolution, Iraq became the second largest oil exporter in the world. The increase in oil export rejuvenated the country's economy; nearly all economic indexes increased to unprecedented levels. From 1970 to 1980 Iraq's economy grew by 11.7 percent. During the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq's oil exporting capabilities decreased, and the price for oil decreased simultaneously. The growth rates of the 1970s were not sustainable; the economy was depended on high oil prices and Iraq's oil exporting capabilities, once oil was cut out of the picture, Iraq's growth would decrease dramatically, even more so during a war, which was the case.[58]

The National Development Plan (1976 –1980) ended with 11 percent GNP. The Iran–Iraq War would halt Iraq's economic development, and would lead to the economic stagnation seen during Hussein's later rule.[59] When Iraq initiated its bombing plan's on Iran, Iran retaliated by bombing Iraq's oil facilities. By the end of the year, Iraq's oil export had decreased by 72 percent because of Iran's bombing strategy.[60] In terms of actual income, oil export as government revenue decreased from 26.1 billion in 1980 to 10.4 billion in 1981. With the oil facilities in the Persian Gulf destroyed, the Iraqi regime had no other choice then to export oil by land; which was far more expensive. Another problem was the gradual erosion of the government's hard currency, and its steadily increased foreign debt.[58]

Military

By the end of the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq fielded the world's 4th largest military, with more than 70 army divisions, over 800 aircraft in the Iraqi Air Force,[61] and a small navy, thanks to funding from the surrounding Persian Gulf states and billions in loans and funding given or secured by the United States to support Iraq's war with Iran.[62][63] Losses during the Gulf War from the United States-led coalition resulted in the reduction of Iraq's ground forces to 23 divisions and the air force to less than 300 aircraft.

Demographics

Culture

The Ba'athist era was a period of secularization in Iraq. The government included people from multiple religious affiliations including Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and Christians. However, the period was marked, especially under Saddam Hussein with sectarian, religious and political strife between the government and other groups including: Shiite Muslims (mainly drawn from Arabs, this religious group formed an absolute majority) who sought to create an Iraqi theocracy, ethnic Kurds who sought independence for their region, Sunnis with an Islamist ideology, and non-Ba'athists - such as the Iraqi communists heavily suppressed in 1978. The government promoted women's rights allowing them education and to serve in the armed forces. The government sought the restoration of Iraqi cultural heritage, such as rebuilding replicas of sections of the ancient city of Babylon. Under Saddam Hussein, glorification of Hussein and the Ba'athist government was common in state-sponsored artwork. The Ba'ath Party dominated the political life of the country, though a National Progressive Front was proclaimed in 1974 to allow for the mostly nominal participation of non-Ba'athist figures and parties in Iraqi politics.

During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein sought to gain support from the Muslim religious community for the government and inscribed the Takbir to the flag, and coat of arms, and motto of Iraq.

Education

Religion

Women's right

References

  1. ^ Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. p. 53. ISBN 978-0060505435. 
  2. ^ Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. p. 54. ISBN 978-0060505435. 
  3. ^ Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. p. 55. ISBN 978-0060505435. 
  4. ^ Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. pp. 56–57. ISBN 978-0060505435. 
  5. ^ Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. p. 57. ISBN 978-0060505435. 
  6. ^ Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. p. 58. ISBN 978-0060505435. 
  7. ^ Tripp, Charles (2010). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. p. 188. ISBN 978-052152900X. 
  8. ^ Tripp, Charles (2010). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. pp. 188–189. ISBN 978-052152900X. 
  9. ^ Tripp, Charles (2010). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. p. 189. ISBN 978-052152900X. 
  10. ^ Tripp, Charles (2010). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. pp. 189–190. ISBN 978-052152900X. 
  11. ^ Tripp, Charles (2010). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. p. 209. ISBN 978-052152900X. 
  12. ^ Tripp, Charles (2010). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. p. 210. ISBN 978-052152900X. 
  13. ^ Tripp, Charles (2010). A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press. pp. 212–213. ISBN 978-052152900X. 
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